Wednesday, July 24, 2013

AGENDA FOR PROSPERITY: LET'S RE-VISIT SOME HISTORICAL DISTANCE TRAVELLED. (Part 1)


Sierra Leone: Lasting Peace or a Cruel Mirage
Dallas L. Browne. History Behind the Headlines: The Origins of Conflicts Worldwide, Vol. 4, 2002.
 

THE CONFLICT

In January 2002 after a decade of civil war, peace was proclaimed in Sierra Leone and tens of thousands of soldiers disarmed as the country awaited democratic elections in May. Grave concerns remain, however, about the endurance of the fragile peace. At Sierra Leone's borders with Liberia and Guinea, continued fighting threatens the weak new government in Freetown.

Political

  • The rebel group that initiated the civil war, the RUF, was formed as a result of its leader Foday Sankoh's training in revolutionary camps sponsored by Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi. The arrest of Sankoh and disarmament of RUF forces within Sierra Leone may not eliminate the rebellion if it is springing from regional sources.
  • The war in Sierra Leone involves many other countries; peace negotiations that apply only within the country may not hold.
  • libhe rebel RUF, under the peace accord, is transforming into a political party. Since many of Sierra Leone's citizens have been terrorized by this group, there is resentment that its leaders may be coming into power.
  • The UN and the government of Sierra Leone have agreed to set up a small-scale international war crimes tribunal to try those most responsible for atrocities in the civil war. Some of the people responsible for war crimes, however, are in positions of power within Sierra Leone, and placing them on trial may stir unrest.

Economic

  • Sierra Leone's economy collapsed during years of war and the nation was rated as having the worst economic conditions in the world in 2001.
  • Sierra Leone's diamond mines have provided funds to a wide variety of organized criminals, rogue governments, revolutionaries, guerrillas, terrorist organizations, and illicit businessmen throughout the world. It is not in their interest for peace to reign in Sierra Leone.
In January 2002 the government and rebel leaders of Sierra Leone declared the end of the 10-year-old civil war in that country. An estimated 47,000 combatants had turned in their weapons, some of which were burned in a ceremonial bonfire outside the capital city of Freetown. At the ceremony the president of Sierra Leone, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, pronounced: "Today we are happy that those flames of war are being extinguished. I declare the war is over and the curfew lifted." He added, "Go and enjoy yourselves."
Although apparently close at hand at the beginning of 2002, peace is like a mirage for the people of Sierra Leone. With warriors disarming, child soldiers being returned to their homes, and rebel leaders agreeing to stop fighting and join in the democratic process, everyone is hoping for an end to the war that has laid ruin to the land and traumatized its people. But after the horrors that have consumed the country since 1991 and the failure of several peace accords, it is difficult for many observers to get past doubt that the violence will end.
Civil war broke out in an already unstable Sierra Leone in 1991 when a group of rebels called the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Foday Sankoh, rose up against the government. It is believed that the group was supported by Liberian rebel (later president) Charles Taylor. Although the RUF claimed to be fighting against a corrupt administration, any original ideology quickly dissipated when the rebels realized that Sierra Leone's greatest natural resource, its diamond mines, could bring them wealth and power beyond their wildest dreams. By 1994 the RUF occupied significant parts of Sierra Leone and had control of the diamond mines.
The war that ensued was bloody and atrocious, notorious for its widespread and gruesome use of children in the military service on both sides. Child soldiers serving the RUF have been trained to attack and mutilate civilians, simply as a message to the population that their government cannot protect them. Not only the civilian population suffered from these atrocities; the children who were trained to kill were often subjected to terrible physical, psychological, and sexual abuse, and were forced into drug and alcohol abuse. Many have grown to adulthood in this environment and have never experienced peace.
Several peace accords have been negotiated in Sierra Leone since 1991, only to fall through.Many former enemies now live together in "peace villages." Yet displays of common purpose during past peace negotiations have at times served to disguise efforts to rearm and regroup for the next battle. It is rumored that many rebels have turned in their guns during disarmament proceedings, only to use the US$300 they were given for obsolete weapons to buy newer and deadlier weapons for the next round of fighting.
This kind of ambivalence has been ever apparent. In June 2001, for example, during an intense firefight in the RUF stronghold of Kailahun, an on-the-spot cease-fire was negotiated between combatants on the front lines. They simply stopped fighting, claiming they were war weary MAP OF THE REGION INCLUDING SIERRA LEONE, GUINEA, AND LIBERIA. (The Gale Group) MAP OF THE REGION INCLUDING SIERRA LEONE, GUINEA, AND LIBERIA. (The Gale Group) after years of killing each other with no obvious result for either side. On the other hand, when temporary peace has been achieved in the past, it has not always been appreciated. Ex-combatants in the peace villages complained about living in mud huts with thatched roofs, eating poor food, not having money, and not having status. A teenager who was, until recently, a general or colonel with his weapon at hand was "somebody," but today he is just another "nobody" in a run-down camp. Unless the ex-rebels and ex-government forces are given good educations and jobs, it is difficult to imagine this shaky peace lasting.
Although there is new hope in 2002 as the RUF disarms for peace, there is concern that the war in Sierra Leone has become a regional war; the country's precious diamond mines have attracted many other countries and revolutionary groups into the conflict. To establish lasting peace not only local players from Sierra Leone, but regional players from countries like Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Libya must be involved in negotiations or at least discouraged from buying conflict diamonds and supplying arms in exchange. The same is true of international players from a variety of nations such as Israel, South Africa, Russia, and Lebanon, and of terrorist groups like al-Qaeda, which has apparently been financing terrorist operations through profits made by trading the diamonds mined by the RUF in Sierra Leone.
The United Nations has its largest peacekeeping force—more than 13,000 people—in Sierra Leone. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the Sierra Leone government announced in January 2002 that they would establish a war crimes tribunal to try those most responsible for atrocities. The tribunal will have a difficult and controversial task, since many of those who should stand trial are still in positions of political power and some are well-liked by the population. Indeed, during peace negotiations, the government has promised to create a multiparty system in which the RUF can participate as a political party rather than as a guerrilla group. Providing amnesty for the rebels is bound to stir up animosity from some of the victims of RUF abuse; prosecuting rebels, though, will also undoubtedly ignite protest among the factions.

The Devastation

Sierra Leone has become a nightmarish landscape over the past ten years. "No hiding place from terror, no safe haven, no place to turn—that is how I would describe my country today—Sierra Leone," said historian and professor Dr. Sylvia Ojukutu-Macauley in an interview with the author. Sierra Leone has a population of 5,233,000 people. Despite being diamond rich and possessing other valuable commodities, Sierra Leone has the lowest per capita income in Africa. In fact, the United Nations Human Development Index rated Sierra Leone dead last in per capita income, health care, life expectancy, and educational levels in its July 2001 ratings of 162 countries of the world. The average person there earns less than $0.20 per day. The infant mortality rate is an appalling 148.6 per thousand. Well over half the population is under 14 years of age. Life expectancy is a mere 34.7 years. There is one doctor for every 11,000 people and most doctors live in the capital, Freetown. They seldom venture into the bush or forests, where most youth live, fight, and die. National health services have collapsed except in Freetown.
The educational system in Sierra Leone has virtually collapsed and the literacy rate has fallen to an all-time low of 31.4 percent. It is little wonder that war is seen as a principal trade for a young person. The only type of education readily available to children is training in the use of guns, bombs, rape, maiming, and murder. In the absence of alternatives, youth accept this nightmarish education and a way of life in which power and social recognition come from the barrel of a gun.
Between 50,000 and 75,000 people have died in Sierra Leone's civil war, largely in fights over the control of diamond fields. More than 20,000 others have been mutilated in RUF attacks that have left victims without hands, arms, feet, legs, ears, or lips. Two million people were living as refugees in neighboring countries in the year 2000. Even with the war officially at an end, hundreds of thousands of Sierra Leonean refugees are afraid to go home.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Temne lived on the coast of Sierra Leone when the Portuguese arrived in the 1400s, the first Europeans to contact Sierra Leone. During the sixteenth century, Europeans frequently traded in Sierra Leone, bringing in cloth and metal goods and taking in exchange ivory, timber, and sometimes slaves. At about the same time Mende-speaking people from what is now Liberia migrated into Sierra Leone. They set up Sierra Leone's Mende states and soon were equal in number to the Temne. At the end of the seventeenth century, a British philanthropic company purchased land from some chiefs, including what is now the capital city of Freetown. There they established settlements for freed slaves. The first group arrived there in 1789. Almost all members of this group perished from disease or were killed by the Temne and the Mende. More freed slaves came from Nova Scotia and then from Jamaica by 1800. The purchased land became a British colony in 1808.
After abolishing the slave trade in 1807 the British began to patrol Africa's west coast, intercepting slave ships and forcing them into Freetown. An estimated 50,000 freed slaves were brought to Freetown in this manner and, although they came from all over Africa, many remained in Sierra Leone, where they became known as Creoles or "Krios." Most were Christian. They developed their own culture in Sierra Leone and prospered through agriculture and trade, forming an elite class that met with resentment from the indigenous groups.
For many years Europeans considered Sierra Leone the educational center of West Africa. Protestant missionaries established Fourah Bay College, a European-style university, there in 1827. Freetown became the headquarters of the British governor who also ruled the Gold Coast (Ghana) and the Gambia colonies. The entire country became a British protectorate in 1896, and English was the official national language. Several times during Sierra Leone's history as a British colony, the indigenous people rebelled against the British and against the Krios, who dominated in economics and politics, but the British were too powerful for them.

Transition to Independence

By the 1950s Britain introduced changes into the Sierra Leone government, allowing the people there more political responsibility. Sierra Leone achieved independence from Britain without violence in 1961. The country chose a parliamentary system, and Sir Milton Margai, leader of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP), was elected prime minister. He died in 1964 and his brother Albert Margai succeeded him. Albert initially attempted to set up a one-party system, but was so violently opposed by the All Peoples Congress Party (APC) led by Siaka Stevens, he was forced to give up on the idea. In 1967 the APC apparently won a contested election. After this, Sierra Leone was cast into a series of coups d'etat. Stevens took office, but within minutes he was overthrown. Just a few days later, there was another coup, and the National Reform Council (NRC) took over. Several years later, another coup returned Sierra Leone to its parliamentary government under the rule of Siaka Stevens.
In April 1971 Sierra Leone became a republic; Stevens became its president. When general elections were held under the new constitution in 1973 there was so much violence that the opposition withdrew. In 1978 Sierra Leone became a one-party state. Stevens managed to survive two attempted coups and kept an iron grip on his power, forging and breaking alliances as needed, and relying on the military to quell the many rebellions. When Stevens stepped down in 1985, his choice for a successor was Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh, who was then chosen as president under the one-party system by the APC.
Unfortunately, Momoh was an inept politician. Under his seven-year-rule, Sierra Leone's economy collapsed. Corruption and mismanagement bankrupted the government. Unpaid civil servants were reduced to stealing office furniture, typewriters, and light fixtures and selling them to get money for food. In Freetown gas, electricity, and currency were scarce. Schoolteachers were not paid and the education system collapsed. Teachers demanded fees from parents to prepare students for examinations. Only professional families could afford to pay schoolteachers, so many children were on the streets without education, jobs, or hope. Many went to work in the diamond fields, but most of them got cheated out of the fruits their labor.
For years Siaka Stevens and then Joseph Momoh had smuggled diamonds out of Sierra Leone, along with hardwood and fish. According to William Reno in Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone, Stevens and Momoh used money from smuggled diamonds to buy rice from abroad. This rice was shipped to political bosses who distributed it to rural communities and urban constituencies in return for votes and political loyalty. At this time many Krios and others from Sierra Leone's professional classes used their political connections and influence to migrate to Europe and America.
Without this critical brainpower Sierra Leone slid from its place as a nation ahead of Malaysia and Singapore to a nation that ranked lower than Somalia and Rwanda in per capita income. Despite its gold, diamonds, bauxite, rutile, iron ore, fish, coffee, and cocoa, Sierra Leone became desperately poor. The population grew increasingly disgusted with their government as poverty gripped them. In the early 1990s prodded by the increasing protest demonstrations, Momoh was establishing a new constitution that would provide for a multiparty democracy in Sierra Leone. He was a little too late.

The Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

In the spring of 1991 a tiny group called the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invaded eastern Sierra Leone, announcing that it was going to launch an armed campaign to eliminate the corrupt politics and elitism of Momoh's government. The leader of this group, Foday Sankoh, was a charismatic man with a background of radicalism. As a student dissident in the 1970s, Sankoh had joined forces with others in Sierra Leone who wished to overthrow the corrupt government. He had been involved in a failed coup against former president Siaka Stevens in 1971, which earned him some time in prison. Upon release he was given a dishonorable discharge from the army. He was later fired from his job as a TV cameraman and he became very bitter.
In 1987 Sankoh went to Libya to join the military training programs sponsored by Libya's leader, Muammar Qadhafi, who hoped to initiate revolutionary movements throughout West Africa. While in Libya, Sankoh became friendly with some of the leaders of Liberia's rebel movement, the National Patriotic Front (NPFL). In 1990 Sankoh went to Liberia to fight in the NPFL's brutal campaign against the government, and while there he got to know the NPFL leader, Charles Taylor, who would become Liberia's president in 1998. With Taylor's backing, Sankoh, by then in his fifties, returned to Sierra Leone and recruited young people there to join his Revolutionary United Front.
While in Libya Sankoh had been trained, along with other Liberian, Sierra Leonean, and Guinean exiles, in Muammar Qadhafi's insurgency techniques. Qadhafi introduced both Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh to his revolutionary theory, teaching them, among other things, that politics and the control of a country should be in the hands of youth. In recruiting soldiers, Sankoh used some of Qadhafi's theory to PEOPLE FLEE FROM SIERRA LEONE, WHICH HAS BEEN DEVASTATED BY FIGHTING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND REBELS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT, WHO TERRORIZED THE POPULATION. (© AFP/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.) PEOPLE FLEE FROM SIERRA LEONE, WHICH HAS BEEN DEVASTATED BY FIGHTING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND REBELS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT, WHO TERRORIZED THE POPULATION. (© AFP/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.) proclaim against the current Sierra Leonean government's patron-client relationships, which used diamond riches to reward only those in the president's small network and neglected the bulk of the nation. Unemployed Sierra Leonean youth with no prospect of gaining an education under the official system rallied to this RUF message of anger, and to promises of shared wealth in the future.
As the RUF entered Sierra Leone, the public was unaware of the group's existence and unprepared for what was to happen next. Rather than waging war against the army or the Sierra Leone government, the band of young soldiers that comprised the RUF attacked defenseless rural civil-ians—elderly men, women, and young children. In order to prove that the government was powerless to help these rural civilians, the RUF butchered them, murdering and raping and frequently using their trademark atrocity of amputating limbs, particularly of children. Whatever ideals the group may have started out with seem to have been quickly lost. The two Libyan-trained dissidents who had accompanied Sankoh as he began his insurrection became disturbed by the atrocities and tried to intervene. He had them executed.
When Sankoh and his soldiers entered a rural region, he ordered the killing of traditional elders and authority figures in areas that fell under RUF control. All government officials were to be killed, leaving no legitimate leaders to oppose the RUF and, in effect, leaving villagers no alternative to RUF control.

Sankoh's Child Soldiers

Sankoh's success in taking over territory was attributable in large part to his management of his youthful troops, many of whom were young children. His initial mission, to recruit an army from among Sierra Leone's poor and alienated rural youth to overthrow the corrupt, wealthy, and powerful elite in Freetown, had strong appeal to many. Beyond that, though, Sankoh made powerful use of traditional culture, incorporating it into his initiation ceremonies for new recruits. Most of his recruits were from the Mende tribe. Sankoh used the Mende initiation ceremonies associated with the "Poro" society for boys.
During a traditional initiation into the Poro society, a boy meets the "bush devil" that seizes him and abducts him from his mother. According to Paul Richards, in Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone, the RUF convinced youth that since state schools had collapsed, it was the role of the RUF to step into the breach, forcibly abducting boys from their mothers and teaching them how to become men. Villagers could in some way justify child abduction by the RUF by likening it to the Poro initiation. In fact, what the rebels did was introduce the children to what is now known as "kalashnikov culture," teaching them to use modern weapons, training them to become looters, military strategists, and violent, ruthless killers.
The captives were vulnerable to their abductors. Poverty and lack of available educational facilities meant that they had little to hope for in their futures. And after capture, many suffered from the "Stockholm Syndrome," a condition in which initially terrified captives subsequently identify with their captors. The RUF captors knew what they were doing. They would first treat the children with violent disrespect and force them to commit unspeakable atrocities. Then the captors would surprise their captives by being suddenly kind, respectful, and gentle with them. The result was predictable. Sierra Leone's abducted children became loyal to the very people who, in many instances, had forced them to kill their parents or brothers and sisters. The RUF commanders became more or less parental figures for these lost youth. Plied with drugs and alcohol, the child soldiers were stuck inside a culture of violence.
It was not just the RUF that used child soldiers, though. The Sierra Leone Army also used forced recruitment of children. For example, a child soldier named Ismael Baeh, who was forcibly recruited into Sierra Leone's army at age 14 described his recruitment like this (as quoted in the Child Soldier Newsletter in 2001): "I either had to join the Sierra Leone Army or to be killed—it was the only way to survive and to be alive. First of all they gave me a brief training in how to use a weapon…. the rebels were attacking where we were in the bush. I did not shoot my gun at first—but when you looked around and saw your school-mates younger than you, crying while they were dying, their blood spilling all over you, there was no option but to start pulling the trigger."

A Civil War

The Sierra Leonean Army under Momoh's regime was incompetent and could not clear the RUF from the diamond fields. In 1992, not long after the RUF first attacked, Sierra Leone Army officers overthrew Momoh. Frustrated by unreliable pay, poor equipment, lack of adequate training, and bad transportation, a group of young soldiers installed 27-year-old Captain Valentine Strasser as head of state. Composed of army officers, Strasser's National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) took over Sierra Leone. They promised to end corruption, improve living standards, and support the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank monetary reforms. The RUF was not appeased, however, and continued to fight the new government. For a time, Strasser's army kept the RUF in retreat in Liberia. Charles Taylor and his rebel troops in Liberia, however, came to the support of the RUF, perpetuating the war.
The familiar cycle of corruption, mismanagement, and misappropriation of government funds A WOMAN WHOSE HAND WAS CUT OFF BY REBEL FIGHTERS IN SIERRA LEONE FEEDS HER CHILD. REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT REBELS HAVE MADE A PRACTICE OF VICIOUS ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS. (© AFP/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.) A WOMAN WHOSE HAND WAS CUT OFF BY REBEL FIGHTERS IN SIERRA LEONE FEEDS HER CHILD. REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT REBELS HAVE MADE A PRACTICE OF VICIOUS ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS. (© AFP/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.) repeated itself under Strasser. Optimism gave way to disappointment in Sierra Leone, and the fighting continued. Some soldiers became so corrupt that they were known as sobels or soldiers by day and rebels by night. Each unit claimed a part of the diamond fields and protected its turf against everyone, including the government that they were sworn to protect and defend. Meantime, the rebels were making headway throughout the country and rapidly approaching Freetown.
As the rebels advanced and the Sierra Leone Army was proving ineffective, Strasser began to rely heavily on Nigerian troops that came to his aid. He also privatized national security by hiring a South African firm known as Executive Outcomes to protect government-controlled diamond fields. Executive Outcomes worked with a rural militia made up of Mendes called the Kamajors. This militia, led by Hinga Norman, was one of several that had formed to protect the people in the countryside, since their government army was unable to help them—these came to be known as the Civil Defense Forces (CDF). The Kamajors went on to become a powerful fighting and political force. They were successful in hunting down and destroying RUF units. In addition, Strasser tried SIERRA LEONE'S PRESIDENT AHMED TEJAN KABBAH AND REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT LEADER FODAY SANKOH TALK DURING A DINNER AT PEACE TALKS IN LOMÉ, TOGO. THE TWO SIDES SIGNED A TREATY IN JUNE 1998 IN AN EFFORT TO BRING PEACE TO THE COUNTRY. (A/P Wide World. Reproduced by permission.) SIERRA LEONE'S PRESIDENT AHMED TEJAN KABBAH AND REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT LEADER FODAY SANKOH TALK DURING A DINNER AT PEACE TALKS IN LOMÉ, TOGO. THE TWO SIDES SIGNED A TREATY IN JUNE 1998 IN AN EFFORT TO BRING PEACE TO THE COUNTRY. (A/P Wide World. Reproduced by permission.) to fortify the army with unemployed youth who were rapidly recruited to swell the regular army's ranks, but being poorly trained they were ineffective. The mercenary soldiers that were called in performed well and drove back the RUF, but they demanded such exorbitant payment that a scandal surfaced that brought down Strasser.

A Coup, an Election, and Another Coup

In the mid-1990s civil society leaders demanded that Strasser organize elections and step down immediately. Strasser initiated the elections, but declared himself a presidential candidate. At 30 years old he was ten years too young to run as a presidential candidate under the Sierra Leone Constitution. His defense minister, Brigadier General Julius Maada Bio, overthrew him, and Strasser fled to Guinea. Bio then negotiated a settlement with the RUF and proceeded with national elections. Chairman of the National Advisory Council Ahmed Tejah Kabbah, a Mende representing the Sierra Leone Peoples Party, was elected in a highly tainted contest plagued by many irregularities, not the least of which was intimidation by the rebel troops. Since the RUF did not want the elections to go through, they used their most vicious tactics—notably cutting off people's hands—to deter them from voting. Kabbah won and was sworn in anyway, and on March 29, 1996, Maada Bio handed power to him.
In November of that year the RUF and Kabbah's government signed a peace agreement called the Abidjan Accord. The agreement provided for demobilization and for the transformation of the RUF into a political party. Within a couple of months Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria. The RUF struggled over choosing a new leader, and the peace accord collapsed when fierce fighting once again erupted.
Kabbah lasted in office only fourteen months. On May 25, 1997, a soldier named Johnny Paul Koroma, heading the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), overthrew the president. Koroma was just out of jail for his part in a 1996 coup attempt, and he quickly formed a military junta to rule Sierra Leone along with his RUF allies. President Kabbah was evacuated to Guinea, along with 200,000 Sierra Leoneans.

Violent Years under AFRC/RUF Rule

Under Koroma, Sierra Leone ousted Israeli and South African private security firms that had been central in the government's defense. The AFRC then suspended Sierra Leone's constitution and formed an alliance with the RUF, bringing chaos to the country. The RUF and the AFRC ravaged Freetown. At that point, Nigeria's dictator, Soni Abacha, with support from the United States and Britain, sent Nigerian troops into Sierra Leone, forming the backbone of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) force.
The RUF demanded recognition as a legitimate government with the right to rule Sierra Leone and to control its resources. No government on earth recognized the RUF/AFRC government. It was a rogue state, a pariah. President Kabbah's government in exile held the distinction of being legitimate to most of the world. Britain, the United States, and the international community pressed for Kabbah's restoration to power. Nigeria, Ghana, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) agreed and kept a regional peacekeeping force in the area to remove Foday Sankoh and the army junta and restore power to President Kabbah. In Sierra Leone new movements arose in opposition to the brutal junta, notably the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. More civil defense forces emerged as the violent junta became increasingly unpopular.

Battles in Freetown

In February 1998 the ECOMOG forces under Nigerian command stormed Freetown in an offensive against the RUF/AFRC forces, trying to get the junta out of the capital. In the terrible fighting that ensued, the RUF/AFRC soldiers carried out many atrocities, increasing their practice of cutting off the limbs of civilians, and burning and looting the city as they retreated. ECOMOG, with the help of the civilian militia groups, was finally able to force the RUF/AFRC troops out of Freetown, and in March President Kabbah was brought back into the capital. His rule, though, did not cover much beyond Freetown. In the ensuing fights around the country the rebels terrorized wherever they fought, destroying towns and villages in their path. Thousands of Sierra Leone's civilians fled to neighboring countries. The RUF secured solid bases in Koindu, Kailahun, and the Kono District's diamond mines by the end of that year. ECOMOG could not keep up with the rebels, and accused neighboring countries, particularly Liberia, of sending in troops to reinforce them.
By December 1998 the RUF had captured several key towns and villages within miles of Freetown. With Sankoh under arrest, RUF commander Sam "Maskita" Bockarie (often called "Mosquito") was taking the lead. He demanded that the government negotiate with him or he would attack Freetown. On the morning of January 6, 1999, the RUF entered the city to carry out "Operation No Living Thing." For several weeks, the hundreds of thousands of city residents were caught in a nightmare in which rebel soldiers raped, murdered, and mutilated residents, and burned down whole neighborhoods.
The city was for the most part without food, water, telephones, or electricity. When the rebels fought with ECOMOG soldiers, they often forced residents to serve as human shields. According to Ron Mitchell in Sojourners more than 5,000 people were killed in this attack alone [other estimates run as high as 7,000], 150,000 became homeless, 2,000 children were abducted by the rebels, and a significant number of aid workers, journalists, and businesspeople were abducted and later murdered. The majority of eastern Freetown's buildings were in ruins after the attack, some of them burned with people locked inside.
The children who, for the most part, carried out this operation had been fed a steady diet of cocaine, marijuana, free sex, and violence. They were on an insane rampage in Freetown. War correspondent Sebastian Junger in Fire described the battle for Freetown as follows: "It does not get any worse than January 6, 1999. Teenage soldiers out of their minds on drugs, rounded up entire neighborhoods and machine-gunned them or burned them alive in their homes…. They killed people who refused to give them money, or people who didn't give them enough money, or people who looked at them wrong…. They…. had been fight ing since they were eight or nine, some of them, and sported names such as Colonel Bloodshed, Commander Cut Hands, Superman, Mr. Die, and Captain Backblast."

The Lome Accord of 1999

By March Freetown was back in the hands of ECOMOG, and President Kabbah was convinced that he needed to negotiate peace, because military solutions could not hold back the RUF. In May 1999 U.S. Special Envoy Jesse Jackson, who had already formed a relationship with Liberian President Charles Taylor, put together a cease-fire, urging the Sierra Leone government to come to terms with the rebels. Kabbah signed the cease-fire agreement with the RUF in May. On July 7, 1999, the Lome Peace Accord was signed. The accord awarded a blanket amnesty for rebels, allowing the RUF to transform from a lawless guerrilla group to a legitimate political party within the Sierra Leone government.
In October Foday Sankoh and Johnny Koroma were brought back to Freetown. Under the accord, Kabbah was to preside over a transitional government in which the rebels would hold key posts until elections could be organized in 2001. Foday Sankoh was given the position of vice president in charge of the national minerals resources commission. Four other cabinet positions were given to RUF leaders. The blanket amnesty of the Lome Accord was controversial. Sankoh, responsible for countless deaths and atrocities, was awarded not only amnesty, but also a high government office without standing for election. To most people, giving him the post of overseeing diamond production was equivalent to letting a wolf guard the chickens.
The Lome Accord set a December 1999 deadline for disarmament. The deadline came and went and only a small percentage of combatants had turned in their weapons. Well into the year 2000, the peace in Sierra Leone was tense, with outbreaks of new violence and atrocities erupting regularly.

The Abduction of the UN Peacekeepers

The United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) began arriving in the country at the end of 1999 to help with the disarmament. The peacekeeping troops in Sierra Leone would soon number around 11,000, but there were major delays in getting there. Great portions of the country remained under rebel control and neither the UN peacekeepers nor the ECOMOG troops were under a mandate to stop the violence. No matter what Sankoh had agreed to, there were now thousands of RUF youths in control of the eastern diamond-mining zone. They had no interest in disarming. Everyone feared sparking another battle and the civilian population was waiting out the upcoming elections in hopes that they would resolve lingering tensions. But on May 3, 2000, those hopes were shattered when RUF soldiers took 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers hostage.
Britain sent in its marines to save the UN peacekeepers. Although all hostages were released by the rebels within three weeks, the abduction of the peacekeepers was the end of conciliation. Angry citizens mobbed Sankoh's home in Freetown, dragging him out and parading him around the city bloody and naked, until the authorities brought him into custody. UNAMSIL sent in more troops, more than 13,000, the largest peace-keeping mission in the world. Britain left its forces in Sierra Leone after its rescue mission and since then has taken a leading role in league with UNAMSIL to create an effective Sierra Leone army and a democratic government.

The Liberian Connection: Charles Taylor

After the arrest of Sankoh, the RUF, led by General Issa Sesay, held on to the diamond mines and with them maintained significant control. Despite international efforts, a tremendous diamond mining and smuggling business under the RUF continued to exist well into 2001. Many of the children the rebels abducted as soldiers were put to work as miners. It is believed that the RUF sold the diamonds to smugglers at a discount, bringing in millions of dollars and supplying the rebels with arms.
It became apparent in a UN investigation that Charles Taylor, by then the established president of Liberia, and President Campaore of Burkina Faso, were supporting and supplying the RUF and were involved in the illicit diamond trade. A UN panel reported: "unequivocal and overwhelming evidence that Liberia has been actively supporting the [RUF] at all levels, in providing training, weapons and related materiel, logistical support, a staging ground for attacks and a safe haven for retreat and recuperation, and for public relations activities." The panel recommended an embargo on all diamonds and timber coming out of Liberia, as well as an air and travel ban for Taylor and his regime. The UN imposed some of these sanctions—a ban on diamond sales and travel by senior officials—on Liberia on May 7, 2001. There are many observers of the war who believe that Charles Taylor is, and has always been, the real leader of the insurrection in Sierra Leone.
On May 15, 2001, the Sierra Leone government and the rebels once again agreed to stop fighting and began to disarm. On May 25, 2001, 424 child soldiers were released in the town of Makeni, Sierra Leone, raising the number the RUF had released to more than 1,000. Many of the children were destined for camps and humanitarian programs sponsored by organizations such as UNICEF and Save the Children, where it is hoped they will get help in the long and difficult process of rehabilitation. British troops were at work training the government army troops. By the beginning of 2002, disarmament was complete. This time there was no blanket amnesty.
The UN and the government of Sierra Leone agreed to a military war crimes tribunal to try UN EMPLOYEES AND BRITISH CITIZENS ARE EVACUATED FROM FREETOWN, SIERRA LEONE. REBEL FORCES OVERTOOK THE CITY AND TOOK 500 UN TROOPS HOSTAGE IN MAY 2000. (© AFP/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.) UN EMPLOYEES AND BRITISH CITIZENS ARE EVACUATED FROM FREETOWN, SIERRA LEONE. REBEL FORCES OVERTOOK THE CITY AND TOOK 500 UN TROOPS HOSTAGE IN MAY 2000. (© AFP/Corbis. Reproduced by permission.) those "most responsible" for the atrocities of the war since November 30, 1996, the date of the failed Abidjan peace agreement between the RUF and the government. Foday Sankoh will almost surely be tried for his part in war crimes. Nevertheless, the RUF still exists and is once again preparing to change from a military organization to a political party. Many of its members still call for the release of Foday Sankoh from prison.

RECENT HISTORY AND THE FUTURE

Free, multiparty elections are to be held in Sierra Leone in May 2002 and UNAMSIL has received a mandate to help organize and monitor them. During 2001 the RUF changed to the RUFP (Revolutionary United Front Party). Although during peace negotiations the RUF urged a power-sharing interim government, it was not granted. They are not popular among the many people they have terrorized. Election results may not be pleasing to them, and they have undoubtedly stored up arms in preparation for this.
With the huge UN peacekeeping force in place in Sierra Leone and billions of dollars coming in from all over the world, the prospects for peace are better than they have been in years. But many fear that the expenses of keeping peace in Sierra Leone have prompted too much international optimism. If the money and peacekeepers are withdrawn, trouble could quickly resume.
The year the rebellion began in Sierra Leone also marked the end of the cold war. When the cold war ended so did most foreign aid. Without aid, many of the state's institutions have collapsed, leaving an open door for opportunists who don't hesitate to use violence to take power. Thus, for the past ten years Sierra Leone has drifted from battle to battle. Peace for both the government and opposition groups has been regarded as an opportunity to recruit fresh forces, to rearm, and to reposition. Violence has been seen as a necessity for control of business and resources.
To many theorists, war as it has been undertaken in Sierra Leone is an extension of business. For the past decade in Sierra Leone war has been the nation's dominant activity, around which have grown many thriving businesses—most illegal and many profiting other nations, while Sierra Leoneans are impoverished. Paul Richards, in his book Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone, believes that this new Sierra Leonean model of war and peace, which he calls the "New Barbarism," is cultural. Those who have been left behind as the country collapses reorganize themselves into warlord groups in order to gain power, social recognition, and access to and control over resources. The two biggest issues facing the young population of Sierra Leone are education and jobs. With legitimate employment unavailable to them, many turned to warlords and violence to insure their survival and their livelihood.
In the last decade the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have imposed "structural adjustment programs." These forced Sierra Leone to reduce the cost of government, leading to dramatic cutbacks in education and social service programs. Forced austerity measures also caused the government to reduce its armed forces, another source of employment for young people. The World Bank may have unwittingly become the RUF's ally in this way.
Cultures of violence evolve to fill power vacuums. Cultural clashes, environmental breakdown, overpopulation, and resource competition can provoke uncontrollable armed conflicts. Many of these conflicts are anarchic disputes that resemble banditry and criminal behavior more than they resemble political competition. Since terrorists attacked U.S. targets on September 11, 2001, many Americans are responding more attentively to the deep-rooted problems around the world. The United States's post-cold war foreign policy often sought insulation from foreign ethnic conflicts and weak governments threatened by collapse. But we now must wonder if these could be the forces that create and nurture future terrorists. It has become apparent that unless weak states receive help, they will provide fertile ground for the violent new cultures of the future.

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Dallas L. Browne

 

CHRONOLOGY
 

CHRONOLOGY

1991 The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invadesSierra Leone, causing more than one million people to flee from their homes.
1992 In a military coup, 27-year-old Captain ValentineStrasser overthrows President Joseph Momoh.
1996 Sierra Leone has its first multiparty elections since1967. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah is elected.
March 29, 1996 Kabbah takes office as president ofSierra Leone.
November 1996 The Abidjan Accord is signed by theSierra Leone government and the RUF. It provides for demobilization and for the transformation of the RUF into a political party. Within a couple of months, however, fighting resumes.
May 25, 1997 Johnny Paul Koroma and his ArmedForces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) overthrow President Kabbah in a military coup. The AFRC then allies with the RUF.
July 19, 1997 Charles Taylor wins the presidential elections in Liberia.
March 1998 ECOMOG, a West African InterventionForce led by Nigerian troops, storms Freetown; President Kabbah is restored to power.
January 6, 1999 The RUF stage an attack on Freetown known as "Operation No Living Thing," killing more than 6,000 people and committing unspeakable atrocities on the residents of the city.
March 1999 ECOMOG regains control of Freetown.
May 1999 Kabbah and the RUF sign a cease-fire agreement.
July 7, 1999 The Lome Peace Accord is signed. The accord awards blanket amnesty for rebels, allowing the RUF to transform into a legitimate political party within the Sierra Leone government.
December 1999 The deadline for disarmament under the Lome Accord comes and goes and only a small percentage of fighters disarm. Violence continues as UN peacekeepers (UNAMSIL) begin to arrive to help with disarmament.
May 3, 2000 The RUF captures 500 UNAMSIL peace-keepers.
May 28, 2000 The RUF releases the last of the UN peace-keepers in Liberia, after the British marines arrive.
May 7, 2001 The UN imposes sanctions on Liberia—a ban on diamond sales and travel by senior officials.
May 15, 2001 A new peace accord is signed byRevolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels, the civil defense forces, and the Sierra Leone government.
May 25, 2001 Hundreds of child soldiers are released in the town of Makeni, Sierra Leone, by the RUF as disarmament begins.
January 18, 2002 The government and rebel leaders ofSierra Leone declare the end of the 10-year-old civil war in that country as disarmament is complete. Weapons are burned at a ceremonial bonfire outside Freetown.




 

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